Abstract Following the enactment of the 2009 Tort Liability Law, the product liability system in China is largely complete. This article sketches the development of this system before outlining some of the main substantive provisions in force today and drawing comparisons between the Chinese approach and the US and European provisions. The Article will conclude that China's product liability system provides an interesting case study which enriches the study of global trends and norms in the product liability arena. In line with many other countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, the main influence on China has been the EC Directive rather than the US model.
increasingly sophisticated Chinese consumers who are ever more willing to pursue their claims to court.
The evolution of the product liability system in China also needs to be set against a complex background of (over-)reliance on administrative remedies and multi-agency jurisdiction over defective products. Although these issues are not unique to China, they can also offer a useful perspective on the developing institutional capacity and regulatory norms in a country striving to move from a Socialist command economy to a modern economy driven by both exports and domestic demand. Both of these avenues for potential growth rely on product quality as a key factor and thus the development of a functional product liability system is crucial to secure the continued economic development of China in the future.
Further, examining the contemporary product liability system in China can illuminate aspects of the evolution of the wider Chinese legal system, such as the tensions between mediation and litigation as preferred methods of dispute resolution; the parallel tensions between civil liability and regulation via administrative means; and the emerging rule of law in China. Analysis of the Chinese product liability system can also contribute to existing debates on product liability on a global basis, including harmonization of product liability norms around the world, as well as the desirability (or otherwise) of such convergence; the increasingly blurred lines between the common law and civil law 'families' (and where East Asian legal systems fit into such a classification); and the twin dominance of the US model and systems based on the EC Directive as opposing models for developing product liability systems to emulate.
The TLL largely completed the formation of a modern product liability system which had been under construction for nearly 30 years. Although the TLL did not alter the pre-existing fundamental roots of the product liability system, it consolidated previous provisions on tortious liability, which were scattered throughout a range of laws, regulations and judicial interpretations, into an inclusive law with 12 chapters and a total of 92 Articles. In particular, the TLL increased the civil remedies available to consumers by introducing punitive damages, only previously available for certain product classes/categories, as well as mandating a universal warning and product recall system. Thus, the second part of this article will cover the background of product liability in China which culminated in the 2009 TLL and essentially aims to detail how and why the product liability regime developed as it did. This section will also contain some comments about how the Chinese experience compares to the development of product liability regimes in other jurisdictions, focusing on the US and Europe.
Next, the third part will discuss some of the most significant substantive provisions of the product liability system in China and draw comparisons with other product liability regimes around the world, in order to evaluate the Chinese system more systematically. In particular, reference will be made to the US product liability system post-Third Restatement 3 and to countries adopting the 1985 EC Directive on Liability for Defective Products, 4 in order to highlight to what extent the Chinese product liability regime is converging or diverging away from product liability norms in other jurisdictions. This section will focus on certain key elements of the product liability system, including: where the relevant rules can be found;
whether the basis of liability is strict or based on fault; the remedies available including the potential availability or otherwise of punitive damages; and the mechanisms available for enforcement either by individual consumers or consumer bodies. The final section will draw these observations together to discuss what the Chinese product liability system can tell us more broadly about the general development of the Chinese legal system, the implications for product liability norms globally, as well as considering any enduring practical and political barriers to the operation of an effective product liability system in China.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY IN CHINA
Civil law matters have generally received scant attention throughout Chinese legal history.
Civil law was largely ignored in imperial China and any tortious liability cases which did arise were largely handled under the criminal law, due to the emphasis on criminal law in the legal system overall at this time. 5 Initial reform efforts began in the Chinese legal system broadly as the Qing dynasty was in its final stages, around the start of the twentieth century.
Scholars looked primarily to Japan for guidance, which itself had been heavily influenced by the German Civil Code (BGB). This 'borrowing' from Japanese codes has been attributed to the similarities between China's legal history and the civilian tradition of codification, as well as Japan's obvious geographical proximity. Despite tort's inclusion in the early twentieth- Liability for the Quality of Industrial Products issued in the same year, these rules signified the first attempt to introduce the notion of product liability into modern China. 13 As no civil recourse had previously been available to dissatisfied consumers, China was essentially constructing a system of product liability from scratch.
The inclusion of product liability in the 1986 GPCL arose from the recognition of the growing needs of the emerging market-based economy and thus represented an ambitious top-down attempt to introduce a tort system capable of supporting further economic reforms;
in particular, attempting to reform China's powerful state-owned enterprises by making them accountable for shoddy goods. These initial steps to introducing product liability principles into China were not insignificant, but overall were 'not sufficiently detailed to be applied uniformly by the courts'. 14 This is clear from the scant detail provided by Article 122 outlined above: how should the manufacturer bear civil liability? What would a claimant need to prove in order to claim? What potential defences would be available to allow a defendant to avoid liability? Without giving any further detail, such a vague provision did not allow for product liability claims to be effectively mounted against manufacturers of defective products by disgruntled consumers.
In addition, the mechanisms provided for enforcing these new product quality standards were almost exclusively limited to public enforcement through state agencies reflecting the 13 For discussion of the origins of tort in China more generally see Lin (n 5 provided: 'Consumers suffering from personal injury or property damage resulting from their purchasing or using of commodities or receiving of services shall have the right to demand compensation in accordance with the law.' Although superficially this provision is not farremoved from the previous provision under Article 122 of the 1986 GPCL, by shifting the focus to the right of the consumer to claim, rather than the liability attaching to the manufacturer, the CRIPL marked a significant shift in the foundations of the product liability system. For the first time, the role of individual consumers as important players in the control of defective products was beginning to be recognized.
Taken together, these two laws (the PQL and CRIPL) worked hand-in-hand to establish a codified framework for the regulation of product quality. However, these 'first generation'
Chinese tort laws still relied on the traditional model of enforcement primarily through governmental administrative agencies rather than empowering individual consumers to bring negligent manufacturers to court directly. 21 Even the PQL 1993, which represented a significant step forward towards a comprehensive framework for the regulation of products, still relied on enforced arbitration rather than the courts as the primary method of dispute resolution. 22 laws passed by the NPC but only where necessary between NPC sessions. In addition, the TLL was passed only three weeks after the period for public comments on the draft law closed, plainly an insufficient time to fully consider the issues raised by comments.
Clearly, there was some urgency to the final passing of the TLL. Officially, the TLL was passed so urgently because it dealt with issues of great public concern. The relevant NPC Work Report proclaims: 'this law is of great importance for protecting the legitimate rights and interests of civil subjects, preventing and punishing infringements of rights, reducing and resolving conflicts in society, and promoting social harmony and stability'. 28 Nonetheless, momentum may also have been provided in the wake of the international outcry following incidents such as the Sanlu melamine-tainted milk scandal and the perceived cover-up and suppression of compensation claims from alleged victims. 29 Several infants died and tens of thousands of others were physically affected by the consumption of infant formula milk which had been adulterated with a chemical called melamine in order to mask the dilution of the milk. The media outcry conceivably led to a speeding-up in the passing of the final TLL.
In this respect, the Chinese experience is similar to the development of the EC Directive.
In Europe, pressure towards introducing a strict liability regime for defective products started to build in direct response to the thalidomide disaster, where a drug used in pregnancy led to catastrophic unforeseen birth deformities. Similar to opinions in the Chinese media postSanlu milk scandal, there was a palpable sense that the victims had not been adequately protected by the law and thus reforms were necessary in order to protect injured parties in future. 30 In addition, politicians recognized that the average citizen did not feel engaged with the European Community and consumer protection measures were felt to be a way of giving the Community 'a human face'. 31 Therefore, the final impetus to promulgating the 2009 TLL in China and the engine driving the drafting of the EC Directive in Europe were fuelled by similar desires to respond to specific product failures.
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Conversely, the development of product liability in the US does not seem to have been motivated by one particular scandal involving a defective product. Rather, prior to the 1960s, US courts had been expanding liability for defective products through contractual liability circumventing the doctrine of privity. However, treating such cases as contractual was stretching such principles to breaking point. Thus, the shift in the US to a system based on Third conversely dealt with bottom-up pressure to stem the flood of product liability cases.
Similarly in China, whilst the first generation of product liability laws arose from top-down political desire to maintain and even stimulate nascent economic reform, the latest amendments to the product liability regime seem to be primarily bottom-up reactions to the negative publicity surrounding the Sanlu milk scandal. However, although the final draft was adopted extremely swiftly, the process of drafting and modifying the TLL had been taking place since the first draft was issued in 2002, so the final law could simply be seen as the culmination of a much longer process. The substantive content of the completed Chinese product liability system will now be considered in more detail.
III. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PRODUCT LIABILITY SYSTEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The the provisions relating to product liability specifically will now be considered, in conjunction with the PQL provisions which still form the foundation of the product liability system.
The first issue at the heart of any product liability system is to locate and define the fundamental concepts such as what constitutes a 'product' and what constitutes a 'defect'.
Another key issue is to establish the parties who may face civil liability under a product liability system and on what basis their liability may arise. This is particularly pertinent with the spread of strict liability in many other jurisdictions globally. The issue of bases of liability is also clearly linked to the issue of available defences and the remedies which may potentially be awarded to victims injured by defective products. Finally, the mechanisms by which product quality and safety standards are enforced cannot be ignored. Although the majority of this paper discusses civil remedies, the role of the responsible governmental administrative agencies also needs to be briefly considered in order to obtain a fuller picture of the product liability system in China.
A. Fundamental Concepts of Product Liability
Where can the relevant legal provisions on product liability in China be found? Despite the 2009 TLL being the latest addition to the product liability laws in China, the relevant chapter 'product' and 'defect' at the heart of the product liability system in China seem to draw on both the US model as well as the EC Directive, with the concept of 'product' more closely aligned to the US exemplar and the concept of 'defect' closer to the European approach.
B. Bases of Liability
It is undeniable that the global trend in product liability over the past 30 years has been towards the wider application of strict liability. However, the careful drafting of the bases of However, Article 42 also provides that 'if the seller is unable to name the producer or supplier of the defective product, the seller shall bear tort liability'. Thus, the seller can also face non-fault liability for the defective product if they are unable to identify the producer or supplier; the aim here is to protect the consumer from the situation whereby they are unable to identify a defendant to bear responsibility. This distinction appears similar to the provisions of the EC Directive whereby the 'producer' of the defective product is the primary defendant (Article 1) but other parties in the distribution chain may face strict liability if they are unable to identify the producer (Article 3(3)). Thus, the Chinese approach seems to mirror the EC Directive rather than the US model under which any commercial party in the manufacturing and distribution chain may be liable as the notion of liability flows from the commercial sale of the product, 41 rather than the specific role of the defendant in that chain.
Article 43 provides that a claimant may choose whether to pursue the producer or the seller for damages and also provides for the producer or seller to seek indemnification from the other if they are at fault. Finally, Article 44 also extends liability to third parties in the chain of distribution such as carriers or warehouse owners. If such a third party is found to be at fault, the producer or seller can seek indemnification from them after compensating the injured party. Therefore, although an injured party cannot claim against a third party in the distribution chain directly, they may still be liable to indemnify the manufacturer or seller if it can be proved that they are responsible for the defect in the product. However, there has been some uncertainty amongst commentators about the precise significance of TLL Article 43. It seems unclear whether Article 43 is intended as a more general statement of liability overriding Articles 41 and 42; by permitting claimants to choose the defendant they wish to pursue, are the manufacturer and distributor really jointly and strictly liable? If this were the case, the TLL would consequently be much closer to the US model of liability. On the other hand, in reality the differences between these two approaches to potential bases of liability amongst defendants in the distribution chain are minimal. 42 It seems more likely on balance that Article 43 is not intended to act as a more general statement of strict liability; rather the provisions distinguishing between fault and strict liability in the preceding two Articles remain as the main principles of liability. Presuming this to be the case then China seems broadly to be following the European approach, which is also in line with the approach taken to the basis of product liability across the Asia-Pacific region more generally. 
C. Available Defences and Remedies
In terms of burden of proof, China again appears to implement a European-based model whereby the claimant must prove defect, harm and causation (EC Directive Article 4) and the defendant then has the opportunity to show that it is probable that the defect which caused the damage did not exist when the product was put into circulation (EC Directive Article 7(b)).
However, in contrast to other jurisdictions in which monetary compensation is the primary Thus, the product liability system again draws on the European approach in terms of available defences.
In terms of recoverable damages, there is an almost complete global consensus that damage to the defective product itself is not recoverable as it is regarded as pure economic loss and China is no exception in this regard. PQL Article 41 is explicit in excluding the defective product itself from the scope of potential liability. In addition, whereas the EC Directive covers both personal injury and property damage over 500 euros, other than the defective product itself (Article 9) and the item of property must fall under the rather vaguely worded 'consumer property' used mainly for private use or consumption, under the Chinese system, no such arbitrary monetary thresholds exist and there is no restriction to the property damage as consumer property. In addition, Article 44 of the PQL, after outlining the damages available for personal injury/death and property damage, also states, 'where the infringed suffers any other serious losses, the infringer shall also compensate for such losses'. This provision consequently seems much more generous than those systems following the EC Directive and potentially closer to the US system which has seen the award of sizable damages to claimants injured by defective products. consumer champion by deliberately purchasing goods which he knew to be fake, then returning them and demanding double the purchase price. He soon shot to fame achieving a celebrity status in China and even set up a consultancy company to expand his fight for consumer rights. 44 Thus, the provision of punitive damages has not been discussed as an obvious mechanism to benefit consumers as it has been widely condemned as having the potential for misuse.
Nevertheless, the availability of punitive damages has now been expanded to all areas of product liability through Article 47 of the 2009 TLL which provides that 'if a producer or seller has clear knowledge that a product contains a defect but nonetheless continues to produce or sell the same, resulting in the death of another or serious harm to the health of another, the injured person shall have the right to demand commensurate punitive damages'.
Thus, the TLL does not offer any further indications of how punitive damages may be calculated, beyond limiting their availability to cases of serious personal injury or death. It is not clear whether the calculation of punitive damages should be linked to the extent of the claimant's injury or to the magnitude of the defendant's behaviour. However, 'Chinese law commentators postulate that courts will be reluctant to award more than double the amount of damages resulting from the injury.' 45 Indeed, the draft of the TLL was amended at the final stage to limit the scope of punitive damages due to concerns about excessive compensation potentially being awarded. 46 There were significant changes between the second draft of the TLL and the final promulgated version. 47 Article 45 of the second draft stated that if production and sale of a product continues although its defectiveness is known and as a result the life and health of an individual is harmed, the victim is entitled to claim for punitive damages according to the law. However, the final promulgated version of the TLL restricts the award of punitive damages to the more limited circumstances where the victim suffers either serious damage to health or death. This echoes the global trend away from awards of large or excessive punitive damages, particularly in the US over the past ten years. 48 Therefore, the availability and calculation of punitive damages remains a grey area within the TLL; with no monetary limits specified within Article 47 itself, and no indication of whether mere constructive knowledge would suffice, 49 close attention should be paid to emerging case law and the latest amendments to relevant laws and regulations to see how these ambiguities are resolved.
D. Enforcement Mechanisms
Although individual consumers are now empowered to initiate civil actions against manufacturers of defective products, administrative mechanisms still play a large role in the Administration for example. 51 There are several areas of overlap in jurisdiction amongst these various agencies and the degree to which they work together in a coordinated manner is not always clear.
One area in which these authorities, particularly the AQSIQ, play a key role is in the administration of a mandatory product recall. Product recalls are now available as a general remedial measure which should be taken if defects are found to be contained in products already placed on the market under Article 46 of the 2009 TLL which expressly sets out a unified warning and recall system for defective products. Further, failure to implement such a recall in a timely and effective manner, shall lead to the producer or seller facing tort liability.
This provision is significant because, although product recalls existed prior to the promulgation of the 2009 TLL, they were for specific categories of products only, rather than as a general measure. However, detailed provisions on how such a recall should be amended CRIPL also offers some clarification on the issue of punitive damages discussed above; a defendant found liable in a civil claim for knowingly selling or supplying a defective product which results in death or personal injury could have to pay punitive damages up to two times the damages suffered by the claimant. This is consistent with the predictions made when the TLL provisions on punitive damages were introduced and suggests that the amount of damages will be strictly controlled to avoid excessive punishment of the defendant.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM AND ENDURING ISSUES

A. Implications for Legal Reforms in China
More generally, what do these changes mean for legal reforms in China? By largely completing the civil law framework, the TLL is noteworthy for finishing the huge legislative task undertaken from the passing of the GPCL in 1986 onwards. In addition, the implementation of the TLL can also provide important indicators about the continued preference for mediation over litigation in the civil justice system, the role of the China Consumers' Association (CCA) as a semi-official body channelling disputes away from the formal legal system, the developing of the rule of law in China through capacity-building of legal institutions, as well as the role of law in China in promoting the 'harmonious society'
ideal by diffusing potential consumer unrest.
The widely documented historical societal preference for dispute resolution outside of the formal legal system has been continued in the reform era with a 'sustained overall policy emphasis on extrajudicial mediation' 55 and this emphasis has certainly been evident in the product liability-related legislation to date with the PQL and CRIPL both mandating mediation as the first dispute resolution method to be undertaken. However, since the second-generation of tort laws began to be promulgated at the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a marked shift towards more formal dispute settlement through the court system. Thus, alternative routes to resolve consumer complaints are still meaningful and it will be interesting to see whether the trend of increasing civil litigation continues or stagnates in the future.
This is closely linked to the important role of the China Consumers Association (CCA) in resolving consumer complaints in China, which reflects many wider issues connected to the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector in China and broader implications for growth of civil society in China. 57 Although the CCA may at first glance appear to be an independent NGO, in reality it is largely subordinate to the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) at both a national and local level, reflecting the murky links between state and semi-official bodies in China. Nevertheless, the CCA does play a hugely significant role in being the initial intermediary dealing with consumer disputes; it handled 665,255
consumer complaints across the country in 2010 according to its own 2010 Annual Report. 58 Arguably, the CCA also acts as an essential diversion of consumer disputes away from the overburdened court system by promoting dispute resolution through mediation.
In addition, it is undeniable that 'promotion of consumer welfare in post-Mao China has been closely related to the preservation of the Party-State'. 59 The issue of consumer rights is therefore intrinsically linked to greater recognition of the rights of an individual in China and also reflects efforts to promote the rule of law in China by entrenching basic expectations for consumers' rights and obligations. 60 Furthermore, the development of consumer rights can also be seen as an essential element of the stated central aim of developing a 'harmonious society' in China; by offering an outlet for individuals to resolve their discontent, consumer rights can diffuse potential social instability, particularly important to balance the effects of inequitable economic development. Moreover, there are strong indicators such as the aims of the TLL set out in Article 1 that the law of tort is used by the Chinese government as a tool by which they can regulate societal relationships and prevent wider disquiet amongst citizens.
This further reinforces the official policy goal of creating a harmonious society and also arguably demonstrates the persistence of an instrumentalist view of the law in China. By using the law as a tool to fulfil policy goals, this could be seen as undermining the development of a wider rule of law, despite the goal of building China into 'a socialist country based on the rule of law' being officially adopted in China by a 1999 constitutional amendment (Article 5). Hence, the TLL has significant implications for the wider Chinese legal system.
B. Implications for Product Liability Systems Globally
The development of a modern product liability system in China also has important implications for the enforcement of product quality globally. Overall, it would appear that On balance, China seems to be drawing more closely on the European approach mirroring the conclusions reached by other commentators considering global trends in this field. 61 The foundations of China's product liability system also seem to echo the findings of a survey of Asia-Pacific countries which found that the European product liability system was the central model for reform, with the US viewed as an outlier. 62 China is thus converging with regional norms in this field, as well as being broadly in line with global trends. Examining product liability norms from a regional perspective also highlights the relative futility of dividing the relevant jurisdictions into civil law and common law 'families'; in the product liability arena, these distinctions are not useful as there is a great deal of consensus around fundamental norms. What is not clear, however, is to what extent such convergence can be attributed to a conscious duplication of foreign models or whether it is due to a reflection of wider universal norms in tort law. 63 On the other hand, there are many features of the Chinese product liability system which originate in neither the European nor the US model, but rather have evolved due to uniquely Chinese conditions. An instance of this can be found in the remedies available to victims of defective products, not only the inclusion of a range of remedies not limited to monetary compensation, but also the standard of punitive damages as twice the damages suffered, which appears to be the consistent measure used from the CRIPL 1993 until today.
In addition, the overall incremental reform strategy of 'crossing the river by feeling for stones' has proved a necessary approach to learn from experience and slowly mould the legal system accordingly. Although this gradual approach could be criticized for limiting the pace of reforms, the legal system could not have coped with a sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of disgruntled consumers at the start of the reform process when there were only a few thousand lawyers in the entire country. 64 Thus, it has proved a useful strategy for the reform of the overall legal system in China by allowing time for capacity to grow before expanding the rights of individual claimants to litigate in the courts. Even so, informal dispute resolution methods such as mediation continue to play an important role in resolving consumer disputes for well-documented cultural reasons 65 and this preference is unlikely to disappear in the short term. These local adjustments to the imported product liability norms provide an interesting example to add to the growing body of case studies which examine how legal transplants have worked in practice rather than maintaining the previous binary approach to the debate. 66 Furthermore, such peculiarly Chinese features suggest that complete harmonization in product liability norms is neither possible nor even desirable as difference in the wider legal system and prevailing legal culture cannot be ignored.
C. Enduring Issues with Product Liability in China
Even though recent changes to China's product liability system have brought the system up to a comparable standard with other countries both regionally and globally, these laws on paper are meaningless if consumers do not exercise the rights afforded to them. There are enduring barriers to the effective implementation of the product liability system in China which are both practical and political. Firstly, it is undeniable that many Chinese consumers never even file a claim for defective products due to a combination of factors. It has been suggested that the level of rights-consciousness is low amongst Chinese citizens and that Chinese culture has an innate disdain for conflict. 67 It is difficult to assess to what extent these cultural factors restrain consumer claims, but it is true to state that the level of damages awarded is low and the legal fees relatively high in comparison. 68 However, such a low number of claims brought under product liability laws can also be observed in many other jurisdictions 69 and so this is not necessarily indicative of a dysfunctional system overall.
In terms of practical issues with product quality and safety standards in China, the huge size of the country is clearly an impediment to consistent and efficient enforcement.
Enforcement is necessarily decentralized down to a local level but this delegation can consequently become entangled in the thorny issue of local protectionism. In other words, the manufacturers responsible for the production of defective products may become so engrained in the local economy that local enforcement bureaus can be reluctant to tackle them for fear of damaging the area economically. A further barrier to effective enforcement can be interagency competition rather than cooperation; with opaque boundaries to each agency's jurisdiction, each rival agency is competing to secure their authority in a particular area or product. This maze of bureaucracy is not unique to China, nor is it unique to the product liability field, 70 but it does provide an enduring barrier to effective enforcement.
Another issue arising from the sheer size of both the country and the Chinese economy is the difficulties with testing products. In the mid-1990s, some local governments granted exemptions from testing to those companies whose products had previously undergone both national and local level checks. Although these exemptions were abolished in 1997, the system was reactivated by AQSIQ in 2000 in response to complaints from many companies about the burden of inspection. 71 However, this system unravelled in the wake of the various product scandals of 2007-08 and is clearly inadequate to protect consumers from defective products. The creation of such an exemption system does nevertheless suggest that the necessary institutional capacity to oversee the entire Chinese product safety and quality system may be lacking.
In terms of political concerns, product liability may also raise several important issues.
Product quality is necessary for continued economic growth, but central policy priorities have now shifted away from encouraging growth at breakneck speed towards a more balanced approach considering the impact of economic growth on rising inequalities in Chinese society. Product liability is crucial in this context not only because of the potential for maintaining social harmony, but also because increased levels of product safety and product quality will be necessary in order to build consumer confidence in Chinese products, both seen very much as a last resort. In contrast, the TLL places civil litigation firmly at the heart of the law of tort in China. It could be argued that the TLL does not make radical changes; in many respects, it merely brings together provisions which were previously scattered throughout various laws and regulations such as the PQL and CRIPL. However, by consolidating these diverse provisions together within a centralized statute, the law is more transparent and thus more accessible for individuals to be aware of their tortious rights and obligations.
On the other hand, the TLL does not replace the existing laws and regulations; by providing a general framework on tort liability, there is still a palpable need to refer back to existing laws for detailed provisions. With regard to many of the main changes wrought by the TLL to the product liability system in China, it remains to be seen exactly how these new provisions will be implemented in practice. Indeed, observers noted that as of early 2011, the new TLL was yet to be widely implemented. 72 Thus, particularly with regard to punitive damages and product recalls, close attention must be made to this area in future as the law and its implementation evolve further.
Overall, China's product liability system provides an interesting case study to enrich the study of global trends and norms in this area. In line with many other countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, China's main influence has been the EC Directive rather than the US model. Nevertheless, the Chinese system is not a wholesale transplant of the European system as it still contains aspects more closely aligned to the US approach. More importantly, there are several aspects to the Chinese system which appear to be more uniquely Chinese and actually potentially point to more successful enforcement of the product liability rules if the imported norms have been blended with the local legal culture. On the other hand, even if the substantive rules match up to emerging global norms of product liability, there remain important differences in procedural rules and access to justice. Therefore, caution must remain in evaluating the Chinese product liability system against global standards and close attention must be paid to how the system is applied in practice.
